COMMENT ON DONOHUE
DANNY BOGGS*

Professor Donohue's article on the effects of fee shifting on settlement,'
which is perhaps the most abstruse article in this symposium, certainly bears
out Dean Calabresi's statement that some hold the attitude that "something
2
may work fine in practice, but we have to show that it will work in theory." I
suppose I have been chosen to try to deal with it because of my sin of
pretending to understand what George Priest was trying to teach some federal
3
judges about economics at a conference last year.
The topic Professor Donohue addresses is a good example of Harry
Kalven's doctrine that the law is "analytically dense." Kalven meant this in
the sense that the term "mathematically dense," when applied to a set of
numbers, means that you can place another number between any two
numbers in the set. 4 Thus, for example, the set of integers is not dense,
because you cannot put another integer between 2 and 3. The set of all real
numbers, however, is dense because you can find another number between
any two real numbers, no matter how small their difference. In the legal
context, there usually exists a complication or an additional fact between any
two concepts or rules that seem to cover a situation that creates a new
situation requiring additional thought. Professor Donohue's article is a good
attack on an extremely dense subject.
My remarks will be a true "comment" on Professor Donohue's article. I
do not intend to debate him, but rather to raise additional questions and
discuss the implications of what he has written. Too often the "Coase
Theorem" 5 is invoked to mean that the legal rule simply makes no difference.
Professor Donohue does not make this mistake, but does not explicitly
countermand it either. The Coase Theorem says that, with the ability to
contract (and no transaction costs!), independent parties should reach the
same decisions on productive processes under any rule of law. Thus the
number of railroads and the amount and nature of wheat farming should not
be affected by who bears the cost of fires started by railroad sparks. This does
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not mean, however, that there are no wealth or allocative effects. Under a rule
favoring railroads, for example, railroads will be richer and farmers poorer.
Thus the rule adopted is not a matter of indifference to legislators, social
philosophers, or the individuals affected.
Professor Donohue constructs his article in the context of settlements at
trial. Courts across the country have noted that the proportion and number of
cases being appealed has continued to rise, although the number of cases filed
in district courts has shown signs of leveling off. Nationally, appeals have
risen seven-fold since 1963, whereas cases filed in district courts have risen
only three-fold. 6 Appeals filed in 1990 constituted 14 percent of 1989's
district court filings, while appeals filed in 1964 numbered only 6 percent of
7
1963's district court filings.
Despite what the theories presented imply, an increasing number of cases
can be, and are being, settled. Professor Donohue and other theorists of
settlement argue that people settle because the cost of proceeding further is
greater than the "uncertainty band" of outcomes. 8 In the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, about 10 percent of the docket settles with staff assistance but with
no court interaction. This settlement rate amounts to about 20 percent of our
oral argument docket and 43 percent of the cases in which settlement is
attempted by the court staff. Unless there is reduced uncertainty on appeal
due to respect for the professional advice of lawyers, the low cost of appeal
should mean that fewer settlements would occur. If anything, the increasing
number of appellate judges (and the perception that recent presidents have
chosen judges from diverse points on the legal spectrum) theoretically should
lead to more uncertainty and less settlement. This point of view
underestimates risk aversion. Although he treats it somewhat in passing,
Professor Donohue does mention that, independent of all other factors, the
higher the level of risk aversion, the more likely settlements are. 9
At the other extreme, there are virtually no settlements at the Supreme
Court level. This may be due to a stronger commitment to principle at this
level of adjudication as well as to the importance of a fixed rule to all parties,
both before the Court and elsewhere.
The operation of the British rule of fee shifting ' ° in Britain, as opposed to
its potential application in America, may occur with lower litigation costs for
procedural and economic reasons. Under the Donohue theories, ceteris
paribus, low cost will result in fewer settlements independent of any other rule.
This could account for a fair number of the differences in the actual results
under the two systems.
6. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 2, 7,
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Furthermore, a few percentage points difference in the percentage of cases
that settle may have a much greater than expected difference in the number
that go to trial. Although it may appear trivial if the percentage of cases
settled can be increased from 90 to 93 percent, this increase would represent
a 30 percent decrease in the number of cases that go to trial.
Since 90 to 95 percent of all cases already settle, the question is not
whether they were settled, but when and at what cost. A number of tentative
steps have been made in the direction of allocating the parties' responsibility
for their pleadings, such as sanctions under Civil Rule 11 and Appellate Rule
2
38, and fee shifting under Civil Rule 68."1 The Equal Access to Justice Act1
and section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code may also shift costs,
although they are a form of "one-way" fee shifting because they rarely, if ever,
can be applied in favor of the government. The courts have shown continued
3
reluctance to push in this direction.'
The British rule or some other device that discourages suits altogether
should be thought of as the ultimate in quick, early, and cheap settlement
because it happens before the suit is even filed, takes no time, terminates the
litigation, and causes no cash outlay. This method of settlement occurs when
risk aversion is a dominant factor, since the plaintiff is in effect betting some
of his own money in undertaking the suit.
Several of Donohue's figures1 4 indicate that pessimistic plaintiffs would be
more likely to settle under the British rule than under the American rule and
that this difference increases with the pessimism of the plaintiff. The figures
also indicate that the likelihood of pessimistic plaintiffs settling under the
British rule increases with the confidence of the defendant. However, these
differences can mean that the small or unsophisticated plaintiff is prejudiced.
The fact that lawsuits may not be filed at all when they have little merit does
not necessarily mean that in the aggregate meritorious claims will be correctly
assessed and compensated. If many plaintiffs each have a 10 percent chance
of winning ("winning" meaning having a meritorious claim and having it so
adjudicated), then a rule resulting in none of these cases being filed (though in
some sense the correct outcome in each case) means that none of the plaintiffs
will be compensated, although by definition 10 percent of their claims are
meritorious.
The ability to contract around the costs and strictures of the current
system represents an avenue for experimentation. In many cases, the parties
can contract in advance to use arbitration and other means of alternative
dispute resolution, and there is no reason that fee-shifting rules cannot be
incorporated into such agreements. Parties already must bear the
11.

FRCP 11; FRAppP 38; FRCP 68.
12. 28 USC § 2412 (1988).
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institutional cost of the arbitrator or "rent-a-judge," and this allocation of
cost represents at least a leaning in the direction of the British rule.
As an aside, I would mention a possible idea for encouraging settlements
from the world of game theory, the concept of the "Schelling Point,"' 5 named
for Professor Thomas Schelling of Harvard. Under this concept, the
prominence of certain facts or features may facilitate agreement. For
example, two parties may be unable amicably to divide a featureless plain or
desert, but could agree to a division if a river line divides it. Two tourists in
Paris are more likely to be able to agree to meet at the Arc de Triomphe than
at any random location on a street grid. Legal rules that could help establish
such points might make outcomes of some disputes more certain and
settlement more likely. In one sense, some common law rules, such as the old
admiralty rules of "divided damages"1 6 and "general average,"' 7 or a rule of
equal division of fault when there is contributory negligence, could be seen as
examples of the Schelling concept.
All ideas and analysis helpful to the process of settlement need to be
pursued vigorously. Professor Donahue's article is a valuable contribution to
that effort.
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